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# LIDDELL HART'S FANTASY: A CLASH OF OFFICIAL HISTORIANS AND A HISTORICAL STRATEGIST

Emmet McElhatton

*"Battle is the final objective of armies and man is the fundamental instrument in battle. Nothing can be wisely prescribed in an army... without exact knowledge of the fundamental instrument, man, and his state of mind, his morale, at the instant of combat".*

Colonel Ardant du Picq, 1868.

In the nearly eighty years since he mulled over other *Reputations*, military theorist and historian Basil Liddell Hart's own scholarly cachet is entrenched in an academic no man's land, stranded between forgiving admirers who shrug off his many flaws and implacable foes who see in their sights only a highly fallible, egotistical fraud

IN THE NEARLY eighty years since he mulled over other *Reputations*, military theorist and historian Basil Liddell Hart's own scholarly cachet is entrenched in an academic no man's land, stranded between forgiving admirers who shrug off his many flaws and implacable foes who see in their sights only a highly fallible, egotistical fraud.[1] And his foes *do* have much to aim at. Morally his vocal espousal of German appeasment during the inter-war period and his self-serving and dishonest elevation of his own legacy in the memoirs of Nazi generals like Guderian and Rommel leave a sense of, at best, imprudence.[2] Theoretically he is notable for his "*uncompromising antipathy*" towards and, possibly, willfull misrepresentation of Clausewitz and, more invidiously, he also stands accused of perfidiously manipulating history to support his theories, particularly that of "the indirect approach".[3] It is his dogged promulgation of this theory and the 'great captains' he championed as practitioners of it, that interests us here, lying at the heart of a spat between Liddell Hart and two New Zealand historians and highlighting the mental gulf between the two military history camps we can dub 'official historians' and 'historical strategists'.[4]

For all his faults, and they can be hard to reconcile, Basil Liddell Hart has still much of importance to give us. His military histories are erudite yet accessable works, written in sparkling prose and rich in insight. His key theories provide a valuable perspective from which we can examine the abstract nature of war.[5] His theory of "the indirect approach" is his most famous, its resilience lending itself to analysis of contemporary conflict, notably shown in the aftermath of the First Gulf War.[6] His thesis is this;

*"Throughout the ages, effective results in war have been rarely attained unless the approach has had such indirectness as to ensure the opponents unreadiness to meet it. The indirectness has usually been physical, and always psychological. In strategy, the longest way around is often the shortest way home"*[7].

This notion of the primacy of the psychological dimension of strategy is as old as war, finding one of its oldest and still most succinct proponents in Sun Tzu. Liddell Hart sought proof of this primacy in every conflict, and argued that the key to a decisive battle was a great captain pursuing the indirect approach. For contemporary examples he lavished attention on the generalship of Heinz Guderian and, particularly, Erwin Rommel.

The war in the Western Desert from 1940-43 still exerts a great pull on the popular imagination. It was one where British Imperial forces largely fought alone and so has a consciousness free of the overbearing American presence of later campaigns. Tactically it has a purity not seen elsewhere. "*It was fought like a polo game on an empty arena ... movement was almost as free as that of a fleet ... there were neither towns nor villages to provide shelter or obstacles ... no civilian population to get in the way of the battle*".[8] Given her crucial role in the campaign, it's no surprise that much of New Zealand's official history focus would be

on the men and battles in Egypt and Libya. Given the complex and fluid course of the war, it is no surprise that it elicited the attention of historical strategists like Liddell Hart.

In January 1954 Liddell Hart wrote and circulated for discussion a paper on Rommel's 24th November 1941 counterstroke during Operation Crusader. While the paper itself has gone to ground we can clearly gauge its premise through Liddell Hart's subsequent writing and primarily from the substantive response and counter-response it provoked.[9]

Liddell Hart believed that Rommel's counterstroke during 'Crusader' was a "*deep exploiting thrust*" at speed to the Egyptian frontier designed to create "*shocks of surprise...in such rapid succession as to demoralise opposition...forestall or paralyse countermoves...creating a continuously spreading collapse*" i.e. a move with primarily psychological aims and to establish a "*strategic barrage...astride his opponents rear*". The paper's aim was, in light of the successful German use of such an approach during the war, to examine a case where the approach *hadn't* worked, understanding *why* it hadn't and learning from insights gained for the benefit of conducting future conflicts. Interestingly he believed a key factor in the failure of Rommel's move was the New Zealand Division's forward push to Tobruk having a counterbalancing psychological effect and "*nullifying Rommel's aim*".[10]

Kip's covering letter would seem almost calculated to offend and antagonise the paper's author. It may be that Kip never imagined the covering letter would be read by Liddell Hart. If that is the case, a somewhat naive side to Kippenberger's character emerges.

The paper reached New Zealand and was read by Major-General Sir Howard Kippenberger and W. E. Murphy in the War History Branch of the Department of Internal Affairs. Their response was a detailed six-page joint critique sent to British official historian Brigadier Harry Latham on 3rd March 1954 along with an eye-catching covering letter from Kippenberger. Both pieces were forwarded by Latham to the English historian. While the joint paper generally sticks to perceptions and interpretations of fact surrounding the battle and would probably have done little more than raise some spirited discussion, Kippenberger's covering letter would seem almost calculated to offend and antagonise the paper's author. It may be that 'Kip' never imagined the covering letter would be read by Liddell Hart. If that is the case, a somewhat naive side to Kippenberger's character emerges. Regardless, his missive disparages Liddell Hart's ideas so tactlessly and carelessly as to lay its author wide open to counterattack.

> "*Harry [Latham]...your correspondence with Liddell Hart was most interesting. I enclose... some notes on his fantasy prepared by Murphy and myself* [my emphasis] *... I think he quite misunderstands the battle*"[11]. Kippenberger's letter is further peppered with condescending remarks. "*Not a tittle of eividence*"... "*there is not anything very deep in this*" ... "*nonsense*" ... "*just another blow in the air*". No, in Kippenberger's opinion there was nothing unusual or particularly interesting in Rommel's actions that day or, "*to my mind anything to show that he acted other than according to his usual practice, that is from day to day and hour to hour, according to the situation as it appeared to him and always with a view to destroying his enemy on the field.*"

Fantasy! The tribulations creative military thinkers faced during the inter-war period are well-known and we have little time to elaborate on them here. Needless to say British defence innovators like Fuller, Hobart or Liddell Hart found their ideas widely disparaged in military circles and subjected to similar language and worse.[12] The approach to Liddell Hart's musings are all the stranger from a self-professed student of history and one who had only recently commented, "*it has been said that at the Somme in 1916 British tactical doctrines reached their lowest depths, and it seemed to me that...Crusader...was fought with an equally total disregard of what one had understood to be the principles of war*".[13] Yet to dismiss attempts to *understand* as fantasy? Kippenberger's dismissive approach is all the odder considering his later assertion, "*I ... have read, usually with respectful agreement, everything that you have published that I know of and possess most of your works*".[14]

Liddell Hart was furious. At the end of July 1954, after "*checking their numerous and often-confused*

*points*",[15] Liddell Hart sent his counter-response[16] to Latham. "*Kippenberger starts by describing the paper as my 'fantasy' and says that it quite 'misunderstands the battle'. But my paper does not deal with the battle, but with the strategical-psychological background. It is very evident that he misunderstands this, and thus the real questions I was mooting and discussing ... it was drafted after long and detailed discussion over a period of years with the principal witnesses available about Rommel's attentions and actions – checking the sparse documentary records with their evidence and vice versa*". (Underlined in the original). For six pages he picked point-by-point through the Kiwi argument which, he thought, showed nothing more than "*an astonishingly careless disregard for the facts – or an ominous tendency to varnish them*". Working to his coup de grace he reiterated the core argument of his original paper and its lesson that Rommel's psychological blow was in part counterbalanced by the unexpected forward thrust of the New Zealand Division. "*The New Zealand historians have evidently misunderstood its trend, and missed the keypoint. It is a pity that they should exert themselves to obscure such a significant lesson – and most ironical that they should discredit such a testimony to the vital effect achieved by the action of the New Zealand Division*".[17] An action as Liddell Hart knew Kip played some part in.

*The New Zealand historians have evidently misunderstood its trend, and missed the keypoint. It is a pity that they should exert themselves to obscure such a significant lesson*

The English historian was not content to avenge the perceived slight by demolishing the argument, he needed to land a blow to the reputation of its author. "*If Kippenberger had spent 'forty years in the wilderness' of history, he would be less inclined to place so much reliance on documentary evidence – especially on the wording of brief battle reports and diaries written by busy and overtired staff officers and their recollection of hasty 'saddle-orders'. It is astonishing that anyone who has had personal experience of battle conditions should, when he turns his hand to history, be inclined to build so much on such fragmentary evidence – like some fanciful archeologists of a past generation. K's comments show all the characteristics of a fine fighting soldier who is out of his depth – they are repeatedly put in a way that one has long learned to recognise as the mark of inexperience*".[18] Hell hath no fury like a strategist scorned!

It seems that Latham, probably with an eye to diplomacy, buried Liddell Hart's riposte for it was not to reach New Zealand for another few years. In late 1956, Liddell Hart and Kippenberger finally made direct contact and corresponded cordially, mainly on official history proofing matters, until Kippenberger's death in May 1957. Realising that Kippenberger hadn't read his 1954 riposte and, the letters hint, keen to see his scholarly blow belatedly hit its mark, Liddell Hart forwarded a copy to New Zealand on 14th April 1957. Between Kippenberger's last brief letter to Liddell Hart on 23 April and Kippenberger's death on 5th May the paper arrived. Kippenberger did not reply and we may never know how he felt about its contents.

Making contact with W.E. Murphy in late 1957, Liddell Hart fished for a response. "*I was very sad at hearing of Kippenberger's death ... Having only got into direct contact with him so recently as last year ... I felt all the more regret. Did he pass on to you the notes which I sent him ... 14th April?*"[19]. Murphy's reply conveys the atmosphere Liddell Hart's material was received in. "*I ... was preparing a rejoinder when Sir Howard ... was suddenly stricken. After he died I made out another ... reply, covering the personal remarks which he would not have allowed me to answer ... it was a bit hot and on second thoughts I did not send it*".[20] The following day Murphy sent his notes with a long letter bringing closure to the Rommel debate between the men. "*Here are my notes on yours of 25th July 1954, resurrected as I promised yesterday. They helped to fill in the blank and miserable days after Kip died when I was not in good form*"[21]. Beside this elegaic opening Liddell Hart closes the matter with a simple scribble;"*End*".

Liddell Hart's criticism of Kippenberger had the intended effect in New Zealand but, with Kippenberger's recent passing, on the wrong man. "*Anyone who knew Sir Howard well would recognise this for what it is – a gross, if unintentional, libel. The intention was of course just to be rude*[22]*, but the weapon turns out to be a boomerang. (Kippenberger) had studied military history for nearly fifty years; it was a passion with him. In this time he built up an almost imcomparable library and became ... an authority on the campaigns of*

*Napoleon and the ... Civil War ... and, in fact acquired more than a passing knowledge of every war recorded in English or French ... there can be few men of any country or era who were so readily able to find historical parallels to actual battle situations, even in the heat of battle. Very few could have put their reading to better use on the battlefield in solving problems, gaining objectives and minimising cost without losing time*".[23] While taking the circumstances the passage was written in into account, it still makes some rather extravagant claims for Kippenberger as a historian and strategist.

Kippenberger had indeed been an avid reader from an early age and the remains of his personal library in the Army Museum, Waiouru, are a fine testament to a life of study. A study of the volumes shows keen engagement with the works and the topics at hand, with much underlining, annotation and highlighting like any good contemporary student. This does not in of itself prove great scholarship. The difficulty with Kippenberger is that, as Murphy acknowledges, his published work was "*fragmentary*".[24] There are many jewels in the hands of private researchers or hidden in archives that have yet to emerge and round out this great New Zealand soldier. In coming years we may have further biographies to complement Glyn Harper's fine, but lonely, volume of biography. Until then we can only judge Kippenberger the historian through a selection of political pamphlets and brief historical articles (not worth our attention here), his work on the official histories and his sole book, *Infantry Brigadier*.

The work marshalling the official history project should be testament enough. It was an impressive undertaking in scope and in the eventual sheer volume of material it created and saved for posterity. Whether it is *good* history is another question. Ronald Walker, himself author of the volume *Alam Halfa and Alamein*, commented in 1969, "*the results in quantity are commendable* ...[but] *in quality ... the results are somewhat uneven*".[25] Liddell Hart himself was somewhat disdainful of official histories. His own experience working on the WWI British histories led him to conclude, "*official history is a contradiction in terms – the word official tends to qualify and often cancels out the word history*".[26] He believed it difficult for anyone to write objectively under both government control and about the actions of professional colleagues, many of whom were likely to be still alive. Harper's biography alone lists numerous examples where Kippenberger has later pulled punches or altered 'the facts' for reasons of loyalty, comradeship or political expediency. At any rate, Kippenberger himself authored none of the volumes, so his most important contribution to the project may be as leader or shepherd, great of itself but not enough for our purposes here. That leaves *Infantry Brigadier*.

Kippenberger was justly proud of *Infantry Brigadier*. First published on the 23rd June 1949 the book was remarkably successful.[27] The first edition of 3,000 copies sold out quickly in 1948, and a second impression of 2,000 copies followed the next year. Between 1950 and 1958 the book sold some 8859 copies in the English speaking world, 2684 in the U.K., 237 in the U.S. and an impressive 5938 in the Dominions Kippenberger did relatively well from the book, earning over £875 from the book in his lifetime, something of between fourteen and twenty thousand pounds in today's money.[28]

It was enthusiastically received on its release. In a review in the Autumn 1949 edition of U.S. journa *Military Affairs*, Sidney T. Matthews,[29] himself an 'official' war historian, greets this "*authentic and ver readable narrative*" by a soldier "*trained in the hard school of experience*" who throughout a work characterise by "*high drama ... humour ... desperate tragedy and devotion to duty*" displays a keen understanding o military tactics and a critical and cogent analysis of the failures and successes of the Allied campaigns. A a historical reference *Infantry Brigadier* has an impeccable pedigree. Corelli Barnett's 1960s best-selle *The Desert Generals* references it frequently (and controversially)[30] while Antony Beevor's 1991 *Crete: Th Battle and the Resistance* uses Kippenberger's biography in a most complimentary manner. Liddell Hart swansong *The History of the Second World War* in 1970 gives a collegial nod to a work he was long familia with. "*In reading (and re-reading) your own book ... I came to feel that I knew you quite well. I got a cop when it was published in 1949 and have recommended it widely*".[31]

But there is something curious about *Infantry Brigadier*. For all that it was written by "*a devout studer of military history*",[32] it is a work curiously devoid of history, military or otherwise. Despite treading i the footsteps of Leonidas, Hannibal, Saladin, Ceur de Lion et al, Kippenberger's book is very much of th

here and now, the job at hand. It may be, as has been suggested to me, that the book was designed to be just that, a contemporary account of a Kiwi infantry commander tackling the task at hand. Kippenberger himself regarded it as "*a fairly representative authoritative statement of the New Zealand point of view*".[33] But surely a man as obviously immersed in history as he was would bring some of it with him to the sole book he writes?

Apart from the historical interests Murphy recounts, Kippenberger was a keen student of the Crusades. In his collection are classic treatments of the period by Charles Oman, W.B. Stevenson and others. All are pointedly annotated, key passages highlighted and constant cross-referencing to other works in the collection. An example of the eye for history Murphy points to can be seen in Stevenson's *The Crusaders in the East.* A reference to the Battle of Harran has Kippenberger scribble in the margin, "*Carrhae where Crassus was beaten 11½ centuries earlier*".[34] Another Crusades volume in the collection is Archer and Kingsford's *The Crusades,* first published in 1894. The book is inscribed "*Brig. H.K. Kippenberger 5 NZ Inf Bde, Aleppo June 1942*". Here was Kippenberger, reading a favoured topic, on the very ground it occurred, as part of a later conquering army in a long and lustrious line and yet turn to the same period recounted in *Infantry Brigadier* and we see … nothing. A scant reference to some temple sightseeing and little else. Most curious for a historian.

Much of the debate between Liddell Hart, Kippenberger and Murphy can be seen in many ways as debates between different schools of history. Dennis Showalter has described official historians as ones who "*tended to become enmeshed in war's nuts and bolts; battles, commanders, weapons and logistics*", while the school of the historical strategists put "*data at the service of theory. Should the fit be imperfect, fact usually went to the wall*".[35] Murphy particularly is adamant that debate should stick to "*the facts of the campaign*".[36] E. H. Carr in his famous lecture "What is history?" spent profitable time musing on the "*fetishism of facts*" common to 19th C. British historians. "*It used to be said that facts speak for themselves. This is…untrue. The facts speak only when the historian calls on them: it is he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order or context … a fact is like a sack – it won't stand up until you've put something in it*"[37]. Much of the Kip/Liddell Hart debate is a sack race then – one team has an army of sacks at the starting line, the other has only one sack, and it is up and running towards the finish line. The historical minutae of the debate is for someone else some other time. What interests this student is what the correspondence shows us of the men themselves and their differing approaches to history and strategy.

Much of the Kippenberger /Liddell Hart debate is a sack race then – one team has an army of sacks at the starting line, the other has only one sack, and it is up and running towards the finish line.

That said, at its heart, the argument is not a disagreement about facts, but something much more emotive. Both parties have opposing opinions about Rommel's quality as a military commander, a debate that still evokes passionate comment today. Liddell Hart's position was simple: he believed Rommel was a military genius, one of the great captains of history.[38] Both Kippenberger and Murphy vehemently disagreed. They believed the general who emerges from *The Rommel Papers* to be "*a fictitious character*", a self-serving construct of Liddell Hart. The real Rommel was "*no superman*" and his actions during Crusader further proof of the "*shallowness of his strategic thinking and his wilful disregard of planning based on any more secure foundation than intuition*".[39]

Like Liddell Hart, Rommel's posthumous cachet has declined in recent years, and many historians tend now to concur with Murphy and Kippenberger. Len Deighton sums him up as "*not one of the war's great generals*", but a "*daring, and in every way exceptional, divisional commander*", promoted above his abilities, leaving no check on his deeply flawed approach to maintaining an army in the field.[40] While there certainly is ample grist to prime the Rommel doubters' mill, the indesputable truth, supported by all manner of contemporary evidence, is that Rommel effected a powerful psychological presence on his enemy, proof enough surely of his credentials as a great commander. Kippenberger himself was possibly

unable to objectively view Rommel *after* the war, having spent so much energy demystifying him *during* it. In *Infantry Brigadier*, he remarked: "*An unduly high opinion of Rommel was prevalent and I more than once checked officers sharply for speaking of him as one of the masters of war. People opposed to these masters usually get beaten and it is unwise to believe your enemy is a god of battles*"[41].

This brief account of a long exchange can only touch the surface of the exchange between a famous strategist, a diligent historian and a revered New Zealand general. It is a debate that shows the differing approaches to the writing of history by Showalter's official historians and historical strategists. More importantly it highlights the primacy of the psychological dimension of war and how the enemy's spirit can be regarded as dangerous, long after his physical presence has passed.

> "*What set out to be a brief covering note has stretched into a long rigmarole, aimed, I suppose, at shaking your astonishing conviction that Rommel was one of the Great Captains of history. I don't imagine that I have succeeded. If you must glorify him facts are not likely to daunt you … But enough of this. I am looking forward to seeing your galleys, though I hope they are not as stimulating as your two studies which prompted this dissertation – if they are I shall never finish commenting on them. With best wishes for Christmas … W.E. Murphy*"[42].

## THE AUTHOR

Emmet McElhatton works in the New Zealand education sector. He has been a print and radio journalist, magazine publisher, building site 'ganger', chef and, in leaner times, a hotel manager and proprietor. He is currently a student of Victoria University's School of Government (and formerly a student of Massey University) interested in leadership, military education and strategic 'history'.

## ENDNOTES

1 For a notably damaging critique see Mearsheimer, John, *Liddell Hart and the Weight of History*, Cornell University Press, New York, 1988.
2 See Searle, Alaric, *A Very Special Relationship: Basil Liddell Hart, Wehrmacht Generals and the Debate on West German Rearmament 1945-1953*, pgs 327-357 in "War in History", Vol. 3, 1998.
3 Castel, Albert, *Liddell Hart's "Sherman": Propaganda as History*, pgs 405-426 in the Journal of Military History, Vol. 67, No. 2, April 2003.
4 Showalter, Dennis E., *Military History*, pgs 204-7 in "The Osprey Companion to Military History", Cowley, Robert and Geoffrey Parker (Eds), Osprey, London, 1996. Pg 206.
5 Lord, Commander David, *Liddell Hart and the Napoleonic Fallacy*, pgs 57-63 in RUSI Journal, April 1997.
6 See e.g. Shumaker, James, *Operation Desert Storm and the Theories of B.H. Liddell Hart*, National War College, Washington D.C., 1991. http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA437398&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. 10 June 2007.
7 Liddell Hart, Basil, *Strategy*, 2nd Edition, Meridian Books, New York, 1991. Pg 5.
8 Barnett, Correlli, *The Desert Generals*, William Kimber, London, 1960. Pg 21.
9 All documents relating to this paper are from file LH 4/38, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Kings College London and quoted with Trustee permission.
10 Liddell Hart, *Notes on Kippenberger's Comments 3.3.54 on my paper "A Strategic Puzzle"*, 25 July 1954. Pgs 5-6. LH 4/38.
11 H.K. Kippenberger *Crusader* letter to H.B. Latham, 3 Mar 1954. LH 4/38.
12 See Dixon, Norman F., *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence*, Futura, London, 1979. Pgs 110-22.
13 Kippenberger, H.K., *Infantry Brigadier*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1949. Pgs 81-2.
14 Kippenberger letter to Liddell Hart, 19th Dec 1956. LH 4/38. If this is the case it lends weight to the belief that many of the military history volumes from Kip's collection have been lost between his death and the Kippenberger Collection moving to it's current home in the Army Museum, Waiouru. Liddell Hart's *Memoirs* list some twenty-nine books written prior to 1956. There are only five Liddell Hart works in the Collection in Waiouru.
15 Liddell Hart letter to Brigadier H.B. Latham, 30th July 1954. LH 4/38.
16 Liddell Hart, *Notes on Kippenberger's Comments 3.3.54 on my paper "A Strategic Puzzle"*, 25 July 1954, LH 4/38.
17 Liddell Hart, *Notes on Kippenberger's Comments 3.3.54 on my paper "A Strategic Puzzle"*, 25 July 1954. Pgs 1-6. LH 4/38.
18 Ibid
19 Liddell Hart letter to W.E. Murphy, 11th Nov 1957. LH 4/38.
20 W.E. Murphy aerogramme to Liddell Hart, 19th Nov 1957, LH 4/38.
21 W.E. Murphy letter to Liddell Hart, 20th Nov 1957, LH 4/38.
22 Liddell Hart annotates his copy of the letter '!!'. A simple explanation of Murphy's outrage is that he may not have read Kippenberger's original letter in full and thus had no empathy for Liddell Hart's somewhat understandable response.
23 Murphy, W.E., *Notes on the Liddell Hart Notes of 25/7/54 regarding "A Strategic Puzzle"*, 10 May 1957. LH 4/38.

[24] W.E. Murphy aerogramme to Liddell Hart, 19th Nov 1957, LH 4/38.
[25] Walker, Ronald, *The New Zealand Second World War History Project*, pgs 173-181 in "Military Affairs", Vol. 32, No. 4, Feb 1969. Pg 173.
[26] Liddell Hart, B.H., *Responsibility- and judgement in Historical Writing*, in "Military Affairs" Vol. 25, No. 1, Spring 1959, Pg 35.
[27] Author's personal e-mail correspondence with Oxford University Press Chief Archivist, Dr. Martin Maw, 27th March 2007.
[28] Figures from OUP publication file, *Kippenberger Infantry Brigadier*, LOCA001815. Reproduced with permission of Secretary to the Delegates OUP and should not be reprinted without permission. £875 6s 10d was the royalty total between 1950 and 1958. The largest payment is from March 1950 when Kippenberger is paid £574 13s 4d. Using the retail price index this 1950 sum is £13,605.02 in today's money. Calculated using tools on www.measuringworth.com 10 July 2007.
[29] Matthews, Sidney T., *Infantry Brigadier by Major General Sir Howard Kippenberger*, in "Military Affairs", Vol. 13, No. 3, Fall 1949, American Military Institute, Washington D.C. Pgs 182-183.
[30] Harper notes that Barnett uses "dexterous sleight of hand" to enforce his thesis by part-quoting Kip to defend the brigade group system of deployment. The full quote from Infantry Brigadier in fact is much more qualified in its support. See Harper, Glyn, *Kippenberge: An Inspired New Zealand Commander*, Harper Collins, Auckland, 1997. Pgs 134-5.
[31] Liddell Hart letter to Kippenberger, 31 Dec 1956. LH 4/38.
[32] Kippenberger letter to Liddell Hart, 19 Dec 1956. LH 4/38.
[33] Ibid
[34] Margin note in Kippenberger Collection, Waiouru copy of Stevenson, W.B., *The Crusaders in the East: A Brief History of the Wars of Islam with the Latins in Syria During the 12th and 13th Centuries*, Cambridge University Press, 1907. Pg. 77.
[35] Showalter, Pg 206.
[36] Murphy, W.E., *Notes on the Liddell Hart Notes of 25/7/54 regarding "A Strategic Puzzle"*, 10 May 1957. LH 4/38.
[37] Carr, E.H., *What is History?* Pelican Books, London, 1964. Pg.11.
[38] See Liddell Hart's *Introduction*, Pgs xiii-xxi in *The Rommel Papers*, Collins, London, 1953.
[39] W.E. Murphy letter to Liddell Hart, 20 Nov 1957. Pg 3. LH 4/38.
[40] Deighton, Len, *Blood, Tears and Folly: An Objective Look at World War II*, Pimlico, London, 1995. Pgs 301-17.
[41] *Infantry Brigadier*, Pg 115.
[42] W.E. Murphy letter to Liddell Hart, 20 Nov 1957. Pg 3. LH 4/38.